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Abstract
In the United States the prevailing public policy approach to mitigating the harms of 
internet surveillance is grounded in the liberal democratic value of transparency. While 
a laudable goal, transparency runs up against insurmountable structural constraints 
within the political economy of commercial surveillance. A case study of the data broker 
industry reveals the limits of transparency and shows that commodification of personal 
information is at the root of the power imbalances that transparency-based strategies 
of consumer empowerment seek to rectify. Despite significant challenges, privacy 
policy must be more centrally informed by a critical political economy of commercial 
surveillance.
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Shortly after Edward Snowden revealed the massive scale and scope of the National 
Security Administration’s communications surveillance programs, Federal Trade 
Commissioner Julie Brill took to the editorial pages of the Washington Post to raise 
another alarm. Brill sought to draw attention to a group of transnational corporations 
called data brokers that, like the National Security Agency, make it their business to 
know everyone’s business. The Commissioner argued that these companies had operated 
in the shadows of public awareness and regulatory oversight for too long. Data brokers 
such as Acxiom, Experian, and ChoicePoint were secretly gathering information about 
millions of people and distributing it to clients for a wide range of uses. The time had 
Corresponding author:
Matthew Crain, Media Studies, Queens College, City University of New York, 65-30 Kissena Blvd, Queens, 
NY 11367-1597, USA.
Email: mcrain@qc.cuny.edu
657096 NMS0010.1177/1461444816657096new media & societyCrain
research-article2016
Article
 at PURDUE NORTH CENTRAL on July 8, 2016nms.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
2 new media & society 
come to demand “transparency from the commercial data brokers that know much more 
about us than we do about them” (Brill, 2013).
The call for transparency is a common refrain in debates about the overreach of pri-
vate and state surveillance alike. Brandeis’ (1913) famous phrase, “sunlight is the best 
disinfectant,” highlights the role of transparency as a pillar of liberal democratic values. 
In many ways, this is an easy position to support: meaningful understanding of circum-
stances is a prerequisite for self-determination. In the case of data brokers, transparency 
proponents argue that consumers need access to information about monitoring practices 
in order to make rational decisions about their personal data. This can be accomplished 
if companies engaging in data collection simply give consumers a seat at the table. In 
Commissioner Brill’s (2013) words, “There is no reason that data brokers and firms that 
use consumer data cannot coexist with a system that empowers consumers to make real 
choices about how our private information is used.”
This essay makes the opposite case. Transparency, while a laudable goal in many 
respects, runs up against insurmountable structural limitations within the political 
economy of the data broker industry. While the intentions of transparency advocates 
are commendable, this policy approach is subsumed by a discourse of consumer 
empowerment that has been rendered meaningless in the contemporary environment of 
pervasive commercial surveillance. Data brokers will not—and indeed cannot—cede 
control over marketing data to consumers themselves without a significant reorienta-
tion of their industry. Utilizing historical methods, including close reading of business 
documents, official regulatory reports, and press coverage, this essay employs political 
economic analysis to diagnose the limits of transparency and interject a theory of com-
modification into policy debates. I argue that commodification of personal information 
lies at the root of the power imbalances that transparency-based strategies of consumer 
empowerment seek to rectify. While there are significant challenges for designing and 
implementing public policies aimed at commodification, regulatory approaches that 
sidestep the issue will remain largely ineffectual. Although these matters are of inter-
national concern and the European Union is an especially relevant comparative case, I 
limit my analysis to the United States. With that delineation, however, the main thrust 
of a commodification-based critique of transparency is potentially generalizable 
beyond the US context.
I begin by outlining the data broker industry and its fundamental characteristic of 
privacy asymmetry. I then survey recent regulatory and legislative efforts to introduce 
transparency into data broker operations in the United States. Examining one major data 
broker’s response to this political pressure illustrates two limits of transparency. On one 
hand, the industry’s structure and operations impede meaningful transparency in signifi-
cant ways. On the other, data brokers appropriate transparency values in public relations 
efforts to deflect the threat of government regulation. This follows a well-worn pattern in 
Internet history whereby commercial monitoring is legitimized under a rubric of con-
sumer choice. As a consequence, transparency initiatives have created the illusion of 
reform while leaving basic power imbalances intact. In the final sections I argue that data 
brokers are better understood via the lens of commodification, rather than consumer 
empowerment, and that public policy must be more centrally informed by a critical polit-
ical economy of commercial surveillance.
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Data brokers and privacy asymmetry
Data broker is an imprecise term. It generally refers to companies that specialize in the 
collection and exchange of personal information and is usually associated with large-
scale, “big data” operations. Major data brokers, also called “information resellers,” such 
as Acxiom and Experian have roots in established business sectors like direct marketing 
and credit reporting. Others like Rapleaf and Datalogix were formed to capitalize on the 
possibilities for data collection and analysis engendered by networked communications 
and computing. Data brokers’ sources, methods, and clients are diverse, but as a group 
they operate at the heart of the expanding industry of commercial surveillance. The 
global data broker industry is estimated to comprise thousands of companies of various 
sizes generating some US$200 billion in annual revenue (Mott, 2014).
The business of data brokers can be classified into two basic processes of data acqui-
sition and data monetization. Data brokers collect a broad array of consumer informa-
tion on a massive scale. As of 2014, Acxiom alone claims to retain over 3000 pieces of 
information for nearly every adult consumer in the United States and offers “multi-
sourced insight into approximately 700 million consumers worldwide” (Acxiom 
Corporation, 2014: 8). Without detailing the universe of information data brokers col-
lect, we can generalize by saying that virtually nothing is out of bounds. Demographic, 
economic, behavioral, health, religion, sexuality, and life event–based information are 
all routinely aggregated.
While data brokers obtain information directly from consumers to varying degrees, 
firsthand collection is overshadowed by two other forms of acquisition: (1) buying 
consumer data from private companies and government agencies and (2) trawling 
public information generated by the state such as property records, voter and motor 
vehicle registrations, court records, and census data. Many companies and govern-
ment entities sell their customer information as an additional revenue stream or 
exchange data as part of service agreements. Walt Disney, for example, sells the age 
and gender of its customers’ children to third party marketing partners (Beckett, 
2014). The US Post Office has long sold lists of recent movers to companies looking 
to market to relocating households. Regarding public records, data brokers employ 
staff to gather this information on a regular basis through online databases, records 
requests, or simply sending researchers to county clerks’ offices. On the monetization 
side, data brokers use consumer data like raw materials to create various informa-
tional goods and services. The majority of the industry is not consumer-facing, serv-
ing instead institutional clients large and small, from companies to non-profits to 
government agencies (Federal Trade Commission [FTC], 2014: 23). Data brokers 
offer products and services integral to a range of business activities including market-
ing, risk mitigation, and identity verification, as well as federal and state law enforce-
ment and counter-terrorism.
Many Americans are aware of commercial monitoring in a general sense and express 
desire for increased control over marketing data practices (Turow et al., 2015). At the 
same time, people generally have only a vague understanding of the extent of commer-
cial monitoring and largely misconstrue actual practices of data collection and the public 
policies that govern them (Whittington and Hoofnagle, 2012). As a former privacy 
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lawyer told 60 Minutes, “It’s not about what we know we’re sharing, it’s about what we 
don’t know is being collected and sold about us” (Messick and Gavrilovic, 2014).
These surveillance practices are characterized by what Andrejevic (2007: 7) calls 
an “asymmetrical loss of privacy.” The basic observation is that people are opened 
up to increasingly extensive forms of monitoring, while the institutions doing the 
monitoring and the information they collect remain hidden from view. Privacy asym-
metry as a descriptive category is especially salient for the data broker industry, 
which has long operated without public awareness or direct regulatory oversight. 
The privacy of those under watch is undermined, while the watchers themselves 
operate with substantial freedom from scrutiny. Individuals, to the extent they are 
aware of data brokers at all, can only engage with them under severe informational 
deficits. Privacy asymmetry also characterizes the relationship among data brokers 
and regulatory agencies, which have struggled in recent years to compel data brokers 
to reveal operational details. As I will demonstrate, these informational tensions 
express a fundamental division that stems from data brokers’ commodification of 
personal information.
Regulatory scrutiny and industry response
While data brokers have historically faced limited governmental oversight, the sector has 
recently attracted the attention of regulators, elected officials, news organizations, and 
civil liberties groups. Generally speaking, these groups have embraced transparency as a 
seemingly straightforward response to privacy asymmetry. As the primary government 
agency involved in consumer privacy protection, the FTC has been at the forefront of 
efforts to investigate data brokers. Spurred on by a series of data security breaches in the 
2000s, the FTC included data brokers within the scope of broader efforts to address 
growing concerns over online privacy (FTC, 2012: 69). In 2012, the Commission took a 
major step in recommending that Congress consider targeted legislation “to address the 
invisibility of, and consumers’ lack of control over, data brokers’ collection and use of 
consumer information” (FTC, 2012: v). In a subsequent report, the FTC identified “a 
fundamental lack of transparency about data broker industry practices” (FTC, 2014: vii). 
The White House (2012) reinforced this message by asking Congress to enact a 
“Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights.” President Obama’s administration drew specific 
attention to data brokers’ aggregation of “personal data from multiple sources, often 
without interacting with consumers at all” (White House, 2012: 13).
Legislators in both houses of Congress opened separate investigations into the data 
broker industry and called company executives to Capitol Hill for hearings (Singer, 
2012; US Government Accountability Office, 2013). Senate Commerce Committee 
Chairman Jay Rockefeller unfavorably compared data broker monitoring to the secret 
surveillance programs of the National Security Administration (Tummarello, 2013). 
Between 2010 and 2015, lawmakers introduced (although did not pass) dozens of bills 
addressing data privacy and security issues including the Consumer Privacy Protection 
Act (2011, 2015), Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act (2011, 2014), and Data Broker 
Accountability and Transparency Act (2014), all designed to inject transparency into 
commercial monitoring.
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Industry-specific legislative proposals are not extraordinary as there is no comprehen-
sive federal law governing commercial collection of personal information (Nehf, 2012: 
61). Instead, privacy protections regarding certain types of data are covered by disparate 
statutes (e.g. health information, financial information, telemarketing). As Bennett 
(1997: 13) argues, the general approach to privacy policy in the United States is “reactive 
rather than anticipatory, incremental rather than comprehensive, and fragmented rather 
than coherent.” As such, data brokers’ marketing activities largely fall outside the scope 
of existing laws like the Fair Credit Reporting Act, which, among other provisions, 
requires consumer reporting agencies to provide individuals with access to credit reports.
Despite variation regarding implementation and scope, a fundamental assumption 
shared among all of these policy efforts is that transparency—the mitigation of privacy 
asymmetry—is key to consumer empowerment over commercial data collection. The 
notion that transparency will empower consumers to make advantageous choices regarding 
their interactions with data brokers lacks immediate credibility simply because data bro-
kers are not consumer-facing companies. The industry has historically operated under the 
radar of consumer awareness. Nevertheless, transparency has been championed within a 
broader “Fair Information Practices” framework that positions disclosure as the necessary 
precursor to individual choice and consent. This logic is prominent at the FTC and frames 
the title of its 2014 report, “Data brokers: A call for transparency and accountability.” It is 
also evidenced in the comments of then Representative (now Senator) Edward Markey, 
who pledged to “push for whatever steps are necessary to make sure Americans know how 
this industry operates and are granted control over their own information” (Calvan, 2012). 
I offer a substantive critique of this policy approach in the final sections of this essay. For 
now, the point to emphasize is that “notice and choice” has been the dominant regulatory 
framework applied to the data broker industry, and indeed much of US privacy policy since 
the 1970s (Simon, 2000: 132–153).
Responding to this surge of political activity, a number of data brokers have taken 
steps to become more transparent. In 2013 Acxiom made headlines by unveiling a con-
sumer information portal called About The Data. Acxiom billed the site as a resource for 
consumers seeking answers to “questions about the data that fuels marketing,” and it was 
received by some observers as a welcome opportunity to peek under the hood of one of 
the nation’s largest data brokers. CNN Money described the portal as “a win for privacy 
advocates who have long called for increased transparency” (Hicken, 2013).
About The Data enables individuals to review some of the information Acxiom has 
collected about them and the data on display are substantial. The site reveals information 
across six categories: demographic, residential, vehicle, economic, purchase history, and 
interests. Within these groups are specific data points regarding age, gender, marital sta-
tus, occupation, income, credit, home ownership, property type, and online and offline 
purchasing records. The experience of seeing one’s personal information displayed in 
such a fashion brings the scope of data broker surveillance into sharp relief. Privacy 
asymmetry is counteracted to the extent that people are enabled to review elements of 
what are clearly extensive marketing profiles. Furthermore, portal users are given the 
opportunity to edit and add information and even opt out of certain marketing programs 
(although the process is convoluted). While Acxiom has not disclosed comprehensive 
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traffic data, CEO Scott Howe unofficially reported that the site received 500,000 visitors 
in the first month of release (Watson, 2014).
Two limits of transparency
A global market leader abruptly reversing its long-standing policy of non-disclosure is a 
significant development that bears scrutiny in the context of ongoing debates about pri-
vacy regulation. Acxiom’s creation of a consumer data portal is instructive for a broader 
critique of transparency-based privacy policy. Specifically, About The Data illustrates 
two significant limitations embedded in efforts to make data brokers more accountable 
via transparency. The first involves structural impediments. Comprehensive transpar-
ency is effectively impossible to implement because privacy asymmetry is a cornerstone 
of the data broker business model. The second limit is regulatory deflection. Transparency 
initiatives have historically been deployed to shore up regimes of industry self-regula-
tion, which have repeatedly failed to protect consumer privacy (Hoofnagle, 2006). 
Following this pattern, Acxiom’s portal exemplifies the political expediency of transpar-
ency for companies looking to continue or expand their surveillance practices unim-
peded by consumer protection regulations.
Drawing upon scholarship from legal studies and political economy of communica-
tions, this section develops the Acxiom case study to demonstrate these limits. The most 
obvious critique of About The Data is simply that it discloses only a small subset of the 
company’s vast stores of consumer information. While Acxiom claims to make 3000 
data elements per person available to clients, the site shows consumers a much smaller 
number, ranging from 50 to 125 attributes (Bryan, 2013). Equally important is Acxiom’s 
framing of its operations: what it says and does not say about how the data are obtained 
and monetized. Although specific data points are disclosed, the portal offers little detail 
about the sources or destinations of this information. Instead, users are directed to a 
“Learn” section that vaguely describes how marketing information is gathered from an 
array of largely un-named sources. The site notes that personal data help to make com-
mercial messaging more relevant, preventing, for example, “advertisers from bombard-
ing you with ads for bicycles if you are a Ferrari aficionado.” This type of sanitized 
language obscures substantive understanding, much in the way that online privacy poli-
cies often bury readers in legal jargon (Turow, 2011: 176–181). Detailed information 
about how data are acquired and monetized lies beyond the bounds of Acxiom’s imple-
mentation of transparency and the balance of the portal’s functionality falls into the 
realm of public relations.
These inadequacies would seemingly be easy to overcome through more robust dis-
closure measures. Setting aside for the moment the difficulties human beings face when 
processing large and complex data sets (Solove, 2013), could data brokers achieve mean-
ingful transparency by releasing comprehensive information about their practices? The 
answer is no because the structure and operations of the industry are incompatible with a 
transparency framework of full disclosure. Once information has been swept into the 
data broker marketplace, it becomes challenging and in many cases impossible to trace 
any given datum to its original source for any combination of the following reasons: (1) 
data brokers maintain that information sources and analytic processes are trade secrets, 
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(2) information buyers and sellers are divorced from information collection by degrees 
of separation via complex markets, and (3) a significant portion of data brokers’ informa-
tion is computationally generated and therefore has no “real” empirical source.
Citing competitive reasons, data brokers have routinely refused to release details of 
their business practices to outside entities (US Senate Committee on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation, 2013: iii). A powerful “discourse of economic secrecy” 
(Cohen, 2010: 886) helps to sustain an environment where even Congress has largely 
failed to compel data brokers to identify information sources and clients. As one exec-
utive testified at a Senate hearing, “I can’t tell you who our clients are. That’s a propri-
etary list of ours. That’s like our secret ingredient” (Tummarello, 2013). Even if data 
brokers were more forthcoming, information sources are not easily traceable because 
specific data points are packaged and repackaged, sold and resold in multi-layered 
markets. One FTC (2014) examination found that nine major data brokers purchased 
substantial quantities of data from other data brokers, who themselves obtained data 
from various sources, and on and on. The complexities of consumer data marketplaces 
are intensified as technologies, analytical processes, and business relationships undergo 
continued development.
While data brokers gather and analyze massive amounts of data, they do not have total 
information awareness. Confronting information gaps about current and potential cus-
tomers has always been a fundamental challenge for marketers. Data brokers have 
responded by developing expertise in inference and prediction, using existing informa-
tion to model data that are inaccessible or do not exist. Here, a distinction can be drawn 
between “core data” obtained through various means of surveillance and “derived data” 
stemming from its algorithmic interpretation. For instance, Acxiom employs modeling to 
derive data in cases where specific information is missing. Categories of race or ethnicity 
might be extrapolated from ZIP code and name, or political affiliation might be inferred 
from home ownership and education. Because they are composites, derived data of this 
nature disrupt the logic behind calls for disclosing the sources of marketing profile infor-
mation in order to promote transparency.
In each of these areas the structure and operations of the data broker industry impede 
transparency initiatives based upon simple forms of information disclosure. Privacy 
asymmetry is a defining feature of data brokerage. Nevertheless, policy initiatives have 
largely focused on “requiring data brokers to provide consumers with access to their data 
… at a reasonable level of detail” (FTC, 2014: 51). Certain recent proposals seek to 
expand the scope of transparency beyond disclosure toward strategies that approximate 
what Nissenbaum (2010) calls “contextual integrity.” This approach argues that consum-
ers must be given a set of reasonable expectations about how data are used once they 
have been collected. Whenever possible, these expectations, or “informational norms,” 
should be drawn from analogue social spheres. For example, a coherent set of privacy 
rules should apply to personal banking across transactional settings such that consumers 
could expect consistent data policies whether banking online, at the ATM, or the teller 
window. Pushing against the dichotomy of online and offline, this approach anchors 
policy to the context of action (e.g. banking, health care) and relieves consumers of the 
impossible burden of interpreting the output of full disclosure for every instance of data 
collection and deployment. Along these lines, the Obama administration’s proposed 
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Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights seeks to implement degrees of contextual integrity by 
limiting the use of consumer data to expressly stated or otherwise “reasonable” purposes 
(White House, 2012).
Like polices of full disclosure, contextual integrity in this formulation is still about 
transparency, only at a higher level of abstraction. A constellation of appropriate uses 
must be made transparent, rather than an absolute account of the operational details. But 
here again, the data broker industry is confounding because the core of its business model 
is about repackaging disparately sourced information to serve purposes other than those 
for which it was originally obtained. Data brokers offer myriad products to inform a wide 
range of decision-making processes, including using analytics to sort people into catego-
ries based on predictions of future behavior, for example, to generate sales leads or to 
make determinations about risk, particularly in the realm of finance. A growing industry 
sub-sector applies “big data” to underwriting, using a wide spectrum of information from 
web surfing habits to social network connections to determine credit-worthiness 
(Morozov, 2013). As one company’s slogan put it, “All data is credit data” (Koran, 2015). 
These and myriad other applications are possible precisely because data obtained in 
given settings are sold, adapted, and resold to serve “downstream” purposes in new 
contexts.
While transparency efforts such as About The Data fail to counteract commercial 
surveillance in meaningful ways, they nevertheless serve important political functions 
for data brokers themselves, namely, deflecting potential government regulation. This is 
the second limit of transparency. As internet business models have pivoted around con-
sumer surveillance, maintaining a public policy regime based on industry self-regulation 
has become a priority for data brokers and the marketing complex at large (Hoofnagle, 
2006). US companies have a long history of working together via trade groups and other 
means to implement self-regulation in order to stave off government oversight. Political 
economists such as Stole (2006) and Niesen (2012) have shown how the advertising 
industry, an analogue of data brokers, has been particularly effective in shaping public 
policy to favor self-regulation, quelling consumer movements that sought government 
protection against commercial abuse. In this context, what has been framed by Acxiom 
as a proactive move is clearly a defensive measure: a regulatory deflection dressed up in 
the trappings of transparency.
Although The New York Times described the About The Data portal as “novel” (Singer, 
2013), it fits within a well-worn public relations strategy in the business of consumer 
data collection. In the late 1990s, the first generation of online data brokers used this 
tactic in contests with regulators and privacy advocates to determine what rules would 
govern Internet data collection and use, broadly conceived. Although not as sophisticated 
as contemporary practices, online consumer data collection was nevertheless rampant 
and largely outside of regulatory purview. Flush with dotcom era finance capital, compa-
nies like DoubleClick (now part of Google) and Engage (now part of Microsoft) devel-
oped massive consumer profiling and ad targeting capacities, which attracted the 
attention of privacy advocates who marshaled policy-makers into action (Crain, 2014).
Data brokers, online advertising companies, web publishers, and marketers formed 
trade groups to fend off regulatory threats and maintain the status quo of advertising 
industry self-regulation. Their weapon of choice was public relations. When the FTC 
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found that 85% of major websites collected consumer information while just 14% dis-
closed such practices, the Direct Marketing Association led a campaign to encourage 
companies to post privacy policies (FTC, 1998: ii). When most policies proved to be 
incomprehensible, companies created templates for general use. Even then (and still 
today), rather than providing genuine transparency, privacy policies “let users know as 
little as possible about data collection activities, in as polite but complex a fashion as 
possible so that they wouldn’t understand what was going on but could feel good about 
them” (Turow, 2011: 83). The adoption of privacy policies forestalled action by the FTC, 
which was persuaded to give the industry more time to develop effective measures of 
self-regulation.
The conflict escalated as data brokers moved forward with efforts to merge online 
information with personally identifiable offline data. While a common practice today, 
the systematic combination of offline and online data was novel at the time and was 
widely perceived as a violation of privacy norms. With increasing public concern, 
Congress considered adopting “opt-in” legislation mandating that companies obtain 
prior consent from web users regarding data collection. Citing a renewed commitment 
to transparency, companies developed privacy portals like DoubleClick’s Privacychoices.
org, which provided information about data practices and offered consumers a mecha-
nism to “opt out” of data collection. Although extremely limited in scope and imple-
mentation, the opt-out option became generalized enough among online advertising 
operations to weaken the case for opt-in provisions. Industry self-regulation was estab-
lished as the default system of governance for online data collection on the basis of a 
veneer of transparency and consumer choice.
This strategy remains important for Internet companies of all kinds. In 2009, Google 
created its “Dashboard” privacy control center in the midst of renewed FTC investiga-
tions and Congressional privacy hearings. Acxiom’s consumer portal is the latest install-
ment in this historical trend and must be understood as a maneuver to manage the risks 
posed by regulation. About The Data seeks to assuage privacy concerns as part of a larger 
effort to “evangelize” a “new Acxiom story” (Acxiom Corporation, 2014). It is important 
to note that the company’s transparency efforts have dovetailed with an aggressive 
growth strategy. According to annual reports to shareholders (Acxiom Corporation, 
2012, 2014), Acxiom increased the number of individuals in its global marketing infor-
mation databases by 40% (from 500 million to 700 million) from 2012 to 2014 and grew 
the number of data points gathered on US consumers sixfold (from 500 to 3000). Perhaps 
most importantly, the About The Data site coincided with the release of Acxiom’s new 
Audience Operating System (AOS), a cloud-based platform enabling “marketers to con-
nect all types of traditionally disconnected data and—for the first time—to create a truly 
singular view of the consumer” (Acxiom Corporation, 2013).
There is a certain degree of instrumental merit to data brokers’ efforts to lift the cur-
tain. Acxiom’s portal presents a jarring snapshot of the magnitude of commercial surveil-
lance. But the bigger picture is that because the United States has an extremely limited 
political baseline for consumer data protection, something like AboutTheData is consid-
ered “novel” or progressive while deflecting the question of whether transparency is an 
appropriate policy approach in the first place.
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Commodification of personal information
Transparency is deployed as a means to empower consumers to transact with data bro-
kers as equals within information marketplaces. While the FTC (2014) and legal scholars 
(Nehf, 2012; Pasquale, 2015; Solove, 2013) have recognized the limits of transparency 
to varying degrees, the policy response has largely been to iterate within the consumer 
empowerment model, emphasizing self-determination and market fairness. The data bro-
ker case study suggests a need for alternative understandings of the policy problems 
associated with commercial surveillance. The issue is not that transparency has not yet 
been properly configured; it is that the consumer empowerment frame misunderstands 
key dynamics of commercial surveillance and therefore offers flawed policy solutions.
Coming from outside the dominant legal paradigm, political economy of communica-
tion advances an alternative understanding of commercial surveillance that places com-
modification at the center of analysis and charts a path for policy to transcend the limits 
of transparency. This perspective situates data brokers within broader capitalist impera-
tives and frames the outcomes of commercial surveillance as a structural issue, rather 
than a problem of transactional fairness. Political economy has developed a multi-
pronged theory of commodification that addresses media content, audiences, and labor 
(Mosco, 1996). Most relevant here is the concept of audience commodification initially 
articulated by Smythe (1977) at the height of the US television broadcast era. Smythe 
argued that the principle product of mass media was not content or ideology, but rather 
the audience commodity. The core proposition was that advertising-supported media 
industries produce aggregates of human attention in various forms to be sold to market-
ers and other entities seeking to influence audience behavior. Reinvigorated by the rise 
of the Internet and mass media’s ongoing adaptation, a burgeoning literature engages 
audience commodification in the digital age (see McGuigan and Manzerolle, 2014).
The tradition I draw upon here looks to Marx’s elaboration of commodification not as 
a roadmap but as a heuristic for understanding data brokers’ acquisition and monetiza-
tion of personal information and how these processes relate to capitalism’s historical 
development and systematic drives. Building on the work of Schiller (2007) and Mosco 
(1996, 2009), I focus on commodification as a fundamental process of capitalism that 
enlarges the social terrain of capital accumulation and reproduces a specific class relation 
between capital and labor. Far from a strictly top-down activity, commodification is 
understood as a dynamic and contested process that incorporates the actions of individu-
als, commercial entities such as data brokers, and state actors like the FTC. However, as 
will be emphasized below, a key insight of commodification theory is that individuals are 
compelled to act “within a social field whose terms of engagement are primarily set by 
capital” (Mosco, 2009: 138).
The acquisition and monetization strategies of data brokers outlined above reproduce 
and extend the processes of audience commodification identified by Smythe. “Non-
rival” inputs are not used up in data broker commodification practices, while the mar-
ginal cost of reproducing digital information is essentially zero. These formal 
characteristics, which led Gandy (2011: 436) to describe information as a particularly 
“troublesome commodity,” have the effect of greasing the wheels of the data broker busi-
ness model. The more any given data point can be repurposed, the more opportunities are 
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created for monetization. For example, utilizing a consumer profile to target an online 
advertisement creates feedback—Did the user click on the ad? Did they make a pur-
chase?—that can then be commodified again and reconstituted as yet another input. This 
“recursive” (Jordan, 2015) or “cybernetic” (Mosco, 1996: 150) process presents cascad-
ing opportunities for monetization that intensify as data brokers form new partnerships.
Recall that data brokers obtain much of their information second hand. Many data 
broker clients engage in information collection practices of their own, functioning as 
both buyers and sellers across various markets. Data brokers represent a central node in 
this matrix of surveillance because they engage in a kind of information arbitrage, buy-
ing, repackaging, and selling consumer data across contexts. More than just information 
collectors and suppliers, data brokers enable information exchange among organizations 
and create markets for consumer data (via what some economists call “platformization”), 
which further incentivizes surveillance among many types of entities. In this way, data 
brokers exemplify what Mosco (1996: 153) terms “extensive commodification,” the 
enlargement of the social terrain of capital accumulation. Acxiom, whose aggressive 
expansion is noted above, routinely seeks out untapped data sources in order to, in the 
company’s words, “reach everyone who needs to be reached” (Acxiom Corporation, 
2016). By facilitating information commodification and exchange among various part-
ners, data brokers connect a multitude of surveillance practices in a “spiral of expanding 
exchange value … that draws all organizations into the orbit of the information business” 
(Mosco, 2009: 143). Simply put, commodification of personal information has become 
one of the Internet’s foremost business models.
This historical arc is elucidated by Schiller (1999, 2007, 2014), who connects infor-
mation commodification to a structural understanding of capitalist imperatives and the 
increasingly outsized role of information and communication technology in capital’s 
accumulation and crisis mitigation strategies. Capitalism has long been “sustained by 
ceaseless enlargement of markets for commodities and this trend continues today in 
information” (Schiller, 2007: 23). Since the latest period of general economic stagnation 
that began in the 1970s, capitalists have been forced to seek out new markets, incorporat-
ing information and communication technologies into the heart of these efforts. This has 
taken a range of forms including movements to expand transnational consumption, 
extend intellectual property regimes, and ramp up the technologies and practices of com-
mercial surveillance.
These developments have been characterized as responses to the recurrent problem of 
overproduction, which is manifested in part by the relentless need to create and maintain 
consumer demand for the torrent of products and services produced by a capitalist econ-
omy dependent upon perpetual growth (Harvey, 1982, 2010). Framing the issue in this 
way historicizes the commodification of personal information as stemming from the 
“pan-corporate need to harness consumption to production” (Schiller, 1999: 124). 
Increasingly, engaging in consumer surveillance is simply the price of doing business for 
all commercial enterprises. Schiller’s approach recalls one of the perhaps less-remem-
bered elements of Smythe’s (1981: 25) original effort, which sought to address audience 
commodification “from the standpoint of its historical-materialist role in making monop-
oly capitalism function through demand management.”
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All of this points to data brokers’ position within a “surveillance industrial complex” 
(Ball and Snider, 2013; see also Zuboff, 2015) in which a range of private and public 
institutions conduct expansive monitoring across communications networks. While 
managing to avoid revealing specifics, Acxiom was finally compelled by Senate investi-
gators to disclose that its customers in 2013 included
47 Fortune 100 clients; 12 of the top 15 credit card issuers; seven of the top 10 retail banks; 
eight of the top 10 telecom/media companies; seven of the top 10 retailers; 11 of the top 14 
automotive manufacturers; six of the top 10 brokerage firms; three of the top 10 pharmaceutical 
manufacturers; five of the top 10 life/health insurance providers; nine of the top 10 property and 
casualty insurers; eight of the top 10 lodging companies; two of the top three gaming companies; 
three of the top five domestic airlines; and six of the top 10 U.S. hotels. (US Senate Committee 
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 2013: 29)
Beyond the private sector, data brokers partner with the Social Security Administration 
and Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and State (US Government Accountability 
Office, 2006).
Ongoing scholarship in political economy explores the ramifications of extensive 
commodification of personal information. Longstanding debates regarding whether and 
how media engagement constitutes a form of labor have been extended to digital plat-
forms (Cohen, 2008; Freedman, 2012; Fuchs, 2010) and often highlight the exploitative 
elements (via capital’s extraction of surplus value) and ideological functions of con-
sumption work. These issues have been addressed at length elsewhere (McGuigan and 
Manzerolle, 2014). For now it is sufficient to consider how commodification of personal 
information relates functionally to self-determination because self-determination is at 
the heart of transparency. Commodification is central to a Marxian critique of capitalism 
in which the basic premise of the labor/capital relation is that workers are compelled to 
turn their labor power into commodities to be sold to capitalist owners of the means of 
production. However, this class relation is not only about control over the means of pro-
duction; it is also about control over the labor commodification process itself. It is about 
a division between those who set the terms that structure an engagement and those who 
submit to those terms.
This fundamental power imbalance is mirrored in the dynamics of commodification 
within pervasive commercial surveillance. An infrastructure of impenetrable monitoring, 
replete with flaws, miscalculations, and multiple points of resistance, nevertheless struc-
tures the terms of everyday engagement with a broadening matrix of activities. Data 
brokers and other surveillance entities unilaterally control the conditions under which 
personal information is commodified. Andrejevic (2007) marks the parallels between 
this “digital enclosure movement” and the historical privatization of public land that 
enabled a newly propertied class to dictate the terms of access for everyone else. For the 
modern class of data subjects, submission to monitoring is simply a condition of partici-
pation in digital life. Transparently disclosed or otherwise, surveillance itself is not up 
for negotiation. Ultimately, the self-determination that transparency efforts seek to 
engender is circumscribed by commodification.
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Critics of this position might argue that the class analogy is flawed because individu-
als are not compelled to use social media, credit cards, online shopping, email, or other 
terminals of consumer surveillance. However, avoiding commodification of personal 
information is increasingly unfeasible (Angwin, 2014), precisely because of the system-
wide demand management processes outlined above. The choice between submitting to 
surveillance or “living under a rock” is no choice at all. Unsurprisingly, consumers are 
increasingly aware of this state of affairs, yet feel powerless to intervene. A recent study 
by Turow et al. (2015) finds that consumers by and large do not understand commercial 
data collection within the rubric of fair market transactions. Instead, most people submit 
to monitoring under a mindset of resignation, believing it “futile to [attempt to] manage 
what companies can learn about them” (Turow et al., 2015: 3).
Conclusion: confronting commodification
The consumer empowerment policy model sidesteps commodification and neglects its 
basic insight: people are the products, not the consumers, of the data broker industry and 
commercial surveillance at large. Consumer empowerment looks to transparency to cor-
rect an imbalanced interaction between more or less equal parties. Commodification 
suggests that unfairness between parties is not a glitch in the system—it is the system. 
Data brokers’ commodification of personal information is deeply entrenched in historical 
processes of capitalist expansion and will continue to become more widespread and 
invasive if left unchecked. The result is a fundamentally inequitable social relation, 
something that transparency alone cannot remedy.
Clearly, this type of diagnosis presents significant policy challenges. Consumer 
empowerment is rooted in a dominant policy discourse of “corporate liberalism” (Streeter, 
1996) in which the government’s perceived role is to facilitate the service of individual 
liberties by private business. When public and market interests diverge, as in cases of 
online privacy, the government must work to harmonize, but always within a framework 
where individual needs can be fulfilled by a technologically sophisticated private sector. 
Capitalist states have long been invested in promoting forms of “marketplace citizenship” 
(Maxwell, 1999) and the FTC’s particular approach to privacy stems from its historical 
mandate to build consumer trust in online commerce (Bamberger and Mulligan, 2011) 
and the larger “interpretive community” (Streeter, 1996) of corporate liberalism.
Policies aimed at commodification would challenge these assumptions, face major 
barriers to implementation, and run head-on into the long-standing antagonism between 
reform and radical structural change (Luxemburg, 1973; Wright, 2015). This is of course 
an enduring problem for critical analysis and activism that I do not claim to solve here. 
As noted above, reformist policies that have intervened into online commercial surveil-
lance have often served to legitimize the regime of commodification of personal infor-
mation. At the same time, bringing radical change to a deeply entrenched system is, to 
put it mildly, a “daunting task” (Wright, 2015).
Rather than pointing to a specific set of proposals, this analysis suggests that in order 
to transcend the limits of transparency, public policy must look beyond consumer 
empowerment to consider how alternative communications infrastructures might counter 
commodification. Activists and policy-makers should take cues from the more radical 
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elements of the media reform movement (McChesney, 2004), which have worked to 
build alternative institutional and operational structures based on public service values, 
rather than the profit model that begets commodification. Again, challenges abound, but 
examples from the low-power radio movement (Dunbar-Hester, 2014) to Wikipedia 
(Freedman, 2012) demonstrate the viability of alternative communications institutions 
and, importantly, show that commodification is not unassailable.
Ultimately, reformers need to broaden their field of vision to account for the problems 
of commodification, just as radicals must continue to navigate and work to alter the lim-
its of the possible. Future research should consider how the regulatory toolkit might be 
renewed under frameworks that challenge commodification and the class relations of 
commercial surveillance. What is certain is that the transparency/consumer empower-
ment policy frame mischaracterizes the problems it purports to address. Failing to con-
front commodification and continuing down the current path will almost certainly 
represent one small step for privacy, one giant leap for commercial surveillance.
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